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THE UNEXONERATED:  
FACTUALLY INNOCENT DEFENDANTS WHO PLEAD 
GUILTY 
 
John H. Blume* & Rebecca K. Helm**  
 
“It’s a total injustice…These three men are being made to plead 
guilty to something they did not do” (John Byers- father of one 
of the alleged West Memphis Three victims)1 
 
Abstract 
 
Several recent high profile cases, including the case of the 
West Memphis Three, have revealed (again), that factually 
innocent defendants do plead guilty. And, more 
disturbingly, in many of the cases, the defendant’s innocence 
is known, or at least highly suspected, at the time the plea is 
entered. Innocent defendants plead guilty most often, but 
not always, in three sets of cases: first, low level offenses 
where a quick guilty plea provides the key to the cellblock 
door; second, cases where defendants have been wrongfully 
convicted, prevail on appeal, and are then offered a plea 
bargain which will assure their immediate or imminent 
release and third, where defendants are threatened with 
harsh alternative punishments if they do not plead guilty. 
There are three primary contributing factors leading to a 
criminal justice system where significant numbers of 
innocent defendants plead guilty to crimes they did not 
commit.  The first is the perceived need that all defendants 
must plead.  The second is the current draconian sentencing 
regime for criminal offenses.  And, the final contributing 
                                                          
*Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. The authors would like to thank 
the participants in the Cornell Law School summer workshop series for 
their helpful comments and suggestions as well as the participants in the  
faculty workshop at the University of South Carolina School of Law for 
their insightful comments and suggestions, and also Professor Anna 
Roberts for her useful comments and suggestions.  
 
**L.L.M., Cornell Law School, 2011; Ph.D. Student, Cornell.  
 
1 International Business Times Reporter, West Memphis Three Walk to 
Freedom: Are They Really Innocent?, International Business Times, August 
20 2011, http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/201046/20110820/west-
memphis-three-walks-to-freedom-are-they-really-innocent-gulity-
damien-echols-jason-baldwin-and.htm.   
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factor is that plea bargaining is, for the most part, an 
unregulated industry.  This article discusses cases in which 
innocent defendants pled guilty to obtain their release, thus 
joining the “unexonerated,” explores the factors that “cause” 
innocent defendants to plead guilty, and finally proposes 
several options the criminal justice system could embrace to 
avoid, or at least ameliorate, the plight of innocent 
defendants who plead guilty.     
 
I. Introduction. 
 
On August 19th 2011, Damien Echols, Jason Baldwin 
and Jessie Misskelley, also known as the “West Memphis 
Three,” were released from prison nearly eighteen years 
after they were first arrested in connection with the murders 
of three eight year old boys in West Memphis, Arkansas.2 
Their freedom came at a significant cost however; to obtain 
their release they pled guilty to crimes they almost certainly 
did not commit.  The deal offered by prosecutors was too 
“good” to turn down.  We might like to think that such 
things don’t happen, or if they do, only very rarely, but, 
innocent defendants do plead guilty more than most people 
think, and certainly more often than anyone cares to admit.  
In this article, we will discuss several cases in which this 
occurred, the reasons why innocent defendants plead guilty, 
and finally offer some tentative proposals to reduce the 
number of instances in which this happens. 
 
Let us begin with a more detailed discussion of the 
West Memphis Three case to set the stage.  The defendants 
were arrested in 1993 after the bodies of three young boys – 
Christopher Byers, Stevie Branch and Michael Moore – were 
found naked and hogtied with their own shoelaces. The 
victims’ clothing was found in a nearby creek.  Byers had 
deep lacerations and injuries to his scrotum and penis.  An 
autopsy revealed that Byers died from multiple injuries,3 
                                                          
2 Campbell Robertson, Deal Frees ‘West Memphis Three’ in Arkansas, N.Y. 
Times, August 19 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08 
/20/us/20arkansas.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
 
3
 FRANK J. PERETTI, WILLIAM Q. STURNER, CHRISTOPHER BYERS AUTOPSY, 
ARKANSAS STATE CRIME LABORATORY, May 7 1993, available at 
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and the other two boys from multiple injuries with 
drowning.4 Misskelley confessed to the murders following a 
twelve hour police interrogation and implicated Echols and 
Baldwin in his confession.  Misskelley later recanted but was 
convicted on the strength of his confession in February 1994 
and sentenced to life imprisonment plus two twenty year 
sentences.5 The prosecution’s case against Misskelley was 
based almost entirely on his confession.  In fact, without the 
statements, the prosecution’s case could not have survived a 
directed verdict motion.6   
 
Echols and Baldwin were convicted of three counts of 
capital murder shortly afterwards. The convictions were 
largely based on prosecution arguments that the defendants 
had been motivated as members of a satanic cult and 
witnesses who said they had heard the teenagers speak of 
the murders.7 Echols was sentenced to death and Baldwin 
received a sentence of life imprisonment.8  
 
                                                                                                                                  
http://www.autopsyfiles.org/reports/Other/west%20memphis%20thre
e/branch,%20steve.pdf 
 
4
 FRANK J. PERETTI, WILLIAM Q. STURNER, STEVE BRANCH AUTOPSY, 
ARKANSAS STATE CRIME LABORATORY, May 7 1993, available at 
http://www.autopsyfiles.org/reports/Other/west%20memphis%20thre
e/branch,%20steve.pdf; FRANK J. PERETTI, WILLIAM Q. STURNER, MICHAEL 
MOORE AUTOPSY, ARKANSAS STATE CRIME LABORATORY, May 7 1993,  
available at: http://www.autopsyfiles.org/reports/Other/west 
%20memphis%20three/moore,%20james%20michael%20.pdf 
 
5
 Youth is Convicted in Slaying of 3 Boys in Arkansas City, N.Y. Times, 
February 5 1994, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/02/05/us/youth-is-
convicted-in-slaying-of-3-boys-in-an-arkansas-city.html 
 
6
 See Misskelley v State of Arkansas, 323 Ark. 449 (1996) at 459, where the 
Supreme Court of Arkansas states regarding Misskelley’s case, “The 
statements [confessions made by Misskelley] were the strongest evidence 
offered against the appellant at trial. In fact, they were virtually the only 
evidence, all other testimony and exhibits serving primarily as 
corroboration”. 
 
7
 Campbell Robertson, Deal Frees ‘West Memphis Three’ in Arkansas, supra. 
 
8 Id. 
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In 2007, new evidence came to light.  DNA testing 
revealed that biological material found at the crime scene 
did not belong to the victims or the three convicted 
defendants.9  However, a hair found in one of the knots on 
one of the hogtied bodies was determined to be “not 
inconsistent” with a DNA sample obtained from the 
stepfather of one of the victims (who was also the last person 
seen with the victims).10  Evidence of juror misconduct 
involving the foreperson of the jury was discovered,11 and a 
witness who allegedly told police she had seen the 
defendants in the area where the crime occurred recanted 
her testimony.12  
 
On November 4th 2010, the Arkansas Supreme Court 
ordered a state trial judge to determine whether the new 
DNA evidence rendered the convictions invalid.13 However, 
before the hearing took place, the prosecution offered the 
West Memphis Three a “get out of jail” (but not free) 
opportunity. Although they would have to plead guilty to 
lesser charges, the three men would not have to admit their 
guilt; they would be permitted to plead guilty while still 
maintaining their innocence using what is commonly called 
an Alford plea.14 And, the agreed upon sentence would be 
                                                          
9 Shaila Dewan, Defense Offers New Evidence in a Murder Case that Shocked 
Arkansas, N.Y Times, October 30 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007 
/10/30/us/30satanic.html. In fact, no DNA from the three alleged 
perpetrators had ever been discovered at the crime scene or on any item 
of evidence.   
 
10 Id. 
 
11
 Campbell Robertson, Deal Frees ‘West Memphis Three’ in Arkansas, 
supra. 
 
12
 Tim Hackler, Complete Fabrication, Arkansas Times, October 7 2004, 
http://www.arktimes.com/arkansas/completefabrication/Content?oid
=1886107.  
 
13
 Echols v State of Arkansas, 2010 Ark. 417. 
 
14
 Campbell Robertson, Deal Frees ‘West Memphis Three’ in Arkansas, 
supra. 
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time served. Thus each defendant would be released 
immediately from prison after the pleas were entered. But, it 
was a “package” deal, and was null and void unless all three 
defendants said yes.15 After some hesitation, all three 
defendants accepted the bargain, entered the pleas and were 
released.16 
 
Was justice served? The plea bargain did secure the 
defendant’s freedom after eighteen years of confinement. It 
also ensured that Echols would not be executed. Almost any 
criminal defense lawyer, including the authors of this essay, 
would have advised them to take it (and would have cajoled 
them to take it if they hesitated).   However their freedom 
came at a high price; the three men pled guilty to a murder 
they adamantly maintained they did not commit, which the 
overwhelming weight of the evidence suggested they did 
not commit, and which almost no one in the community 
where the crime occurred believed they committed.  
Furthermore, because a plea is a conviction, the three men 
are now all “convicted murderers.” This will continue to 
have significant effects on their ability to find employment, 
they are deprived of most of their civil rights and of any civil 
remedy they possibly had against either the police or 
prosecutors, leaving them without any compensation for the 
eighteen years of wrongful imprisonment. 
 
The prosecution’s plea offer was (and was designed 
to be) highly coercive. The chances that any one of the three 
would have been found guilty at a new trial were slim; the 
prosecutors admitted as much.17 But, the prospect of 
                                                          
15 David Koon, Jason’s choice: friendship, freedom and a principled stand, 
Arkansas Times, August 24 2011, http://www.arktimes.com 
/arkansas/jasons-choice/Content?oid=1888400 
 
16
 Campbell Robertson, Deal Frees ‘West Memphis Three’ in Arkansas, 
supra. 
 
17 See Max Brantley, Prosecutor’s Statement on West Memphis 3 Plea 
Deal, Arkansas Times, August 19 2011, http://www.arktimes.com 
/ArkansasBlog/archives/2011/08/19/prosecutors-statement-on-west-
memphis-3-plea-deal (in which the prosecutor, Scott Ellington, states: “it 
would be practically impossible to put on a proper case against the 
defendants in this particular case after eighteen years of extended 
litigation”). 
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immediate release from prison made “rolling the dice” at a 
new trial (assuming the judge ordered one) a risky 
proposition, and one not many persons imprisoned for 
nearly two decades would be likely to take, or one any 
competent attorney would advise them to take. Adding to 
the coercion was the condition that if any of the three 
rejected the offer, the other two could not take advantage of 
the deal. This put great pressure on Misskelley and Baldwin 
to accept the plea for their friend’s sake; Echols was still on 
death row and faced the possibility of execution.18 In fact, 
press accounts revealed that Baldwin did not want to plead 
guilty and would have preferred to take his chances before a 
new jury. “This was not justice,” he said immediately 
following the plea. “However, they’re trying to kill Damien, 
sometimes you just have to bite down to save somebody.”19 
Echols later thanked Baldwin at a press conference for his 
decision to accept the plea despite his misgivings.20  
 
The “deal” in this case almost certainly resulted in 
three innocent men pleading guilty to something they did 
not do. They were offered a deal they could not realistically 
refuse. They now stand “convicted” of the murders of three 
young boys.  Should such a result be tolerated? Should 
prosecutors be allowed to coerce factually innocent 
defendants to plead guilty to crimes they did not commit? It 
is a question worth asking because the West Memphis Three 
case is not unique. Innocent defendants plead guilty quite 
frequently. It is one of many dark secrets of the criminal 
justice system.  
 
As we will discuss below, the modern American 
criminal justice system has three features that create the 
                                                                                                                                  
 
18
 David Koon, Jason’s choice: friendship, freedom and a principled stand, 
supra. 
 
19
 Id.  
 
20
 “West Memphis Three”: Damien Echols overwhelmed by release, CBS News, 
August 19 2011, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-20094730-
504083.html.  
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hydraulic pressure which increases the risk of innocent 
defendants pleading guilty: (1) the system’s need (or at least 
perceived need) for the overwhelming majority of 
defendants to plead guilty; (2) draconian sentences for many 
offenses and offenders; and, (3) an almost complete lack of 
judicial regulation of the plea bargaining process. These 
three factors combine to create a system in which innocent 
defendants can be coerced to plead guilty.  
 
 
II. A Brief History of Plea Bargaining 
 
We next provide a brief overview of the history of 
plea bargaining, a subject which (many) entire books have 
been written about.21  
 
Plea bargaining first became common in the United 
States in the mid-1800s,22 and by 1967 the American Bar 
Association was beginning to embrace the practice, noting 
that it was necessary given the system’s lack of resources.23 
However, the constitutionality of the practice was not firmly 
established until 1970.24 Negotiated pleas became the 
                                                          
21
 See, e.g., GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH, A HISTORY OF 
PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003), MIKE MCCONVILLE AND CHESTER 
MIRSKY, JURY TRIALS AND PLEA BARGAINING: A TRUE HISTORY (2005); 
MARY E VOGEL, COERCION TO COMPROMISE: PLEA BARGAINING, THE 
COURTS AND THE MAKING OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY (2007).  
 
22 JENIA I. TURNER, PLEA BARGAINING ACROSS BORDERS: CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE (2009) 
 
23
 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY 2 (Approved draft 1968). 
 
24 See Brady v United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).  Robert Brady was 
indicted in 1959 for kidnapping and failing to release a hostage without 
harm, which carried a maximum penalty of death penalty.  But, he could 
only be sentenced to death if: a) he went to trial; b) was convicted; and, c) 
the jury recommended death as the appropriate punishment. Brady 
chose to plead guilty to avoid the risk of capital punishment, and he was 
sentenced to fifty years imprisonment. Eight years later, Brady 
challenged the constitutionality of his guilty plea based on the Supreme 
Court’s intervening decision in United States v Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 583 
(1968), which held that the statutory scheme authorizing the death 
penalty only for those who went to trial had the “inevitable effect…to 
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primary means of disposition of criminal cases as crime rates 
rose in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s and as the number of 
state and federal crimes proliferated in response to public 
demand for action.  For example, the number of felony 
prosecutions (and the number of prison inmates) more than 
doubled between 1978 and 1990.25 The increase in the 
number of cases was not accompanied by sufficient 
additional resources to handle them, i.e., additional 
prosecutors, public defenders and judges.26 Thus, it quickly 
became generally accepted that the system could only 
process the growing backlog of cases by reducing the 
number of trials.  To reduce trials, it was essential that more 
defendants plead guilty.27 And, they did.  
 
Today plea bargaining is accepted as an essential and 
permanent component of the American criminal justice 
system. Between 2008 and 2012 more than 96% of all 
resolved criminal cases culminated in plea bargains rather 
than trial.28 In 2012, 97% of cases that were resolved were 
settled through pleas, with only 3% being adjudicated in 
                                                                                                                                  
discourage assertion of the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty 
and to deter exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to demand a jury 
trial.”  Brady argued that his plea was invalid as it was induced by the 
threat of death. The Court, however, held that Brady’s plea was knowing 
and intelligent at the time it was entered; he understood the risks and 
obtained the benefit of the bargain. Id. at 756. Furthermore, the Court 
determined that the criminal justice system could not operate if 
intervening decisions upset pleas previously entered. Id. 
 
25 William J Stuntz, Bordenkircher v Hayes: Plea Bargaining and the 
Decline of the Rule of Law in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 351, 378 
(STEIKER, 2005).  
 
26 For e.g. From 1974 to 1990, almost the same period in which caseloads 
doubled, the number of assistant prosecutors nationwide rose less than 
20%, from 17,000 to 20,000 (BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, US 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS (1990), at 1, 
available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/psc90.pdf) 
 
27 Stuntz, supra at 363. 
 
28 US SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2012 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL 
SENTENCING STATISTICS, FIGURE C, http://www.ussc.gov/Research 
_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2012/sbtoc12.htm 
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bench or jury trials.29  As Justice Kennedy recently observed: 
“the reality [is] that the criminal justice system today is for 
the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”30  
And the view of pleas has changed.  Once thought to be a 
“necessary evil,”31 plea bargaining is now applauded as an 
efficient means of disposition.  Two terms ago, in a different 
case, Justice Kennedy, again speaking for a majority of the 
Court, stated: “[t]o note the prevalence of plea bargaining is 
not to criticize it.  The potential to conserve valuable 
prosecutorial resources and for defendants to admit their 
crimes and receive more favorable terms at sentencing 
means that a plea agreement can benefit both parties.”32  
 
The system’s need for defendants to plead guilty 
 
The current conventional wisdom is that without the 
ability to dispose of the vast majority of cases through plea 
bargaining, the criminal justice system would collapse 
inwardly upon itself like a legal black hole.  More than forty 
years ago, then Chief Justice Warren Burger stated that “a 
reduction from 90% to 80% in guilty pleas requires the 
assignment of twice the judicial manpower and facilities” 
and, “a reduction to 70% trebles the demand.”33 Regardless 
of whether the former Chief Justice’s resource allocation 
assessments are accurate, it is almost universally accepted by 
the participants in the system that there are not enough 
                                                          
29 Id. 
 
30 Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012). 
 
31 Lafler, supra at 1397 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“until today, [plea 
bargaining] has been regarded as a necessary evil.  It presents grave risks 
of prosecutorial overcharging that effectively compels an innocent 
defendant to avoid massive risk by pleading guilty to a lesser offense ; 
and for guilty defendants it often—perhaps usually—results in a 
sentence well below what the law prescribes for the actual crime. But 
even so we accept plea bargaining because many believe that without it 
our long and expensive process of criminal trial could not sustain the 
burden imposed on it, and of system of justice would grind to a halt”).  
 
32 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1407-08 (2012). 
 
33 Warren E. Burger, The State of the Judiciary, 56 A.B.A. J. 929, 931 (1970). 
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personnel, court time or funds to try every case, or for that 
matter even any significant percentage of cases.34 In 
Santobello v New York the Supreme Court concluded plea 
bargaining was: "… an essential component of the 
administration of justice...If every criminal charge were 
subjected to a full scale trial, the States and the Federal 
Government would need to multiply by many times the 
number of judges and court facilities.”35   Thus while some 
critics question the fairness and integrity of a system that 
must forego trials to survive, the practice is not going 
away.36 Quite the contrary; as noted by the Supreme Court 
in Missouri v Frye: “In today’s criminal justice system the 
negotiation of a plea bargain rather than the unfolding of a 
trial, is almost always the critical point for a defendant”.37    
 
Draconian sentences for many offenses and offenders 
 
Assuming that it is correct and desirable (or at least 
necessary) that most defendants plead guilty, the most 
effective way for the prosecution to induce pleas is to offer 
incentives to defendants to waive their right to trial. 
However, the rise in crime rates described above was 
accompanied by a political demand to “get tough” on 
                                                          
34 See Hessick and Saujani, Plea Bargaining and Convicting the Innocent The 
Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel, and the Judge, 16 BYU J. Pub. L. 
189 at 227 (2002) (outlining the argument that plea bargaining is 
necessary for system efficiency); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 
(1977) (“whatever might be the situation in an ideal world, the fact is that 
the guilty plea and the often concomitant plea bargain are important 
components of this country’s criminal justice system. Properly 
administered they can benefit all concerned”). 
 
35
 404 U.S. 257 (1971), at 260 
 
36
 See Q2 2013 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SECOND 
QUARTER FY2013 QUARTERLY SENTENCING UPDATE, TABLE 22 at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Federal_Sentencing_Statistic
s/Quarterly_Sentencing_Updates/USSC_2013_Quarter_Report_2nd.pdf 
(showing that from October 1 2012 to March 31 2013, 96.9% of criminal 
cases were resolved by plea rather than by trial).  
 
37
 Frye, supra  at 1408 
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crime.38 Thus during the same period, minimum and 
maximum sentences also rose sharply, as did the enactment 
of a variety of recidivist statutes.39  Furthermore, in the same 
era, legal definitions of criminal intent and liability were also 
expanded making it easier to convict defendants of more 
serious crimes. Given the new weapons in their inducement 
arsenal, prosecutors began to “encourage” guilty pleas by 
threatening harsher punishments.40 As legislatures added 
new crimes and increased sentences, a “menu” was created 
giving a charging list of sentencing options to prosecutors to 
extract bargains.41 This created a plea bargaining system 
whereby extremely coercive “deals” were offered to 
defendants both in terms of incentives to forego trial and 
avoidance of much harsher punishment.  
 
Lack of judicial regulation of the plea bargaining process 
 
The system can operate in such a coercive manner 
because plea bargaining is, for the most part, an unregulated 
“industry.” It is true that there are some statutes and rules 
that provide guidelines and limits on plea bargaining.42 In 
federal cases, for example, the judge who accepts the plea 
must be satisfied that there is “a factual basis” for it, advise 
the defendant whether the court is bound by the parties’ 
recommendations, decide whether to accept or reject the 
plea agreement and ensure the proceedings are captured in a 
verbatim record to facilitate review.43  However, judicial 
focus for the most part is on whether the plea was knowing 
and intelligent. The determination of whether the plea 
agreement is truly voluntary does not depend on the 
substantive terms or generosity of the bargain. Because a 
                                                          
38 Stuntz, supra at 378.  
 
39 Id. 
 
40 Id. 
 
41 Id. 
 
42 See, e.g.,Ariz Crim Proc Rule 17.4; Colo Crim Proc Rule 11(f); Fed Rules 
Crim Proc Rule 11. 
 
43 Fed. R. of Crim. Pro. P. 11. 
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plea is only involuntary when it is “the result of force or 
threats or of promises” extraneous to the agreement itself,44 
prosecutors have wide latitude in setting the terms of plea 
arrangements.45  
 
Debate regarding the current system and conviction of 
innocent defendants 
 
This system, including its desirability and morality 
have been, and continue to be, debated in the academy and 
by judges and practicing lawyers. The academic literature is 
varied in its reaction to plea bargaining and consists 
primarily of both attempts to provide a theoretical 
justification for plea bargaining,46 and critiques of the 
                                                          
44 Fed. R. of Crim. Pro. P. 11(b)(2). 
 
45For example, as noted previously, in Brady v United States, the Court 
held that the threat of the death penalty could be used to induce a guilty 
plea as long as the plea was knowing and intelligent.  Furthermore, a 
large differential between the sentence a defendant would face after trial, 
and the sentence he receives under the terms of the plea agreement, does 
not render the agreement involuntary. Bordenkircher v Hayes (434 U.S. 357 
(1978) effectively rejected the suggestion that prosecutors cannot 
threaten a criminal punishment that has not been applied, at least 
occasionally, to similarly situated defendants. This means that a charge 
that would not have been bought originally could be threatened if a 
guilty plea was rejected. Justice Powell was critical of this in his Hayes’ 
dissent stating:  “[t]he question that must be asked is whether the 
prosecutor might have reasonably charged the respondent under the Act 
in the first place.” While the Federal Sentencing Guidelines may have 
remedied this to some extent, for example by only allowing a maximum 
sentence reduction of 25% from the benchmark sentence in return for a 
guilty plea, this was largely neutralized by the case of United States v 
Booker 543 U.S. 220 (2005) which reduced the status of the guidelines 
from binding to advisory.  
 
46 See, e.g., Thomas W. Church, Jr., In Defense of “Bargain Justice,” 13 L. & 
Soc'y Rev. 509, 511 (1979) (defending the rationality of the plea 
bargaining system against critics); James E Bond, PLEA BARGAINING AND 
GUILTY PLEAS 2D. ED. NEW YORK: CLARK BOARDMAN & CO., 1982 
(discussing the constitutional status of plea bargaining and standards for 
accepting guilty pleas); Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a 
Market System, 12 J. Legal Stud. 289, 308-09 (1983) (arguing that plea-
bargaining is desirable as a mechanism for setting the price of crime); 
Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale 
L.J. 1909 (1992) (setting forth a contract theory of plea bargaining and 
urging structural modifications to account for innocent defendants), 
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current plea bargaining process.47  Some object to the new 
reality of plea bargaining on the basis that it diminishes 
community participation in the criminal justice system, 
places too much power (and coercive power) in the hands of 
prosecutors rather than neutral judges, often pits lawyers 
against their clients thus eroding the attorney-client 
relationship, and allows defense counsel to “cut corners.”48  
                                                                                                                                  
Frank H Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 Yale L.J. 1969 
(1992) (defending plea bargaining based on autonomy and efficiency); 
Scott W Howe, The Value of Plea Bargaining, 58 Okla. L. Rev. 599, 603 
(2005) (arguing that plea bargaining is valuable as it maximizes deserved 
punishment at a reasonable cost and generally treats defendants fairly). 
 
 
47 Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing The Criminal Defendants Right to 
Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. Chi. L. R. 931, 932 
(1968) lists some common objections: plea bargaining makes a 
substantial part of an offender's sentence depend, not upon what he did 
or his personal characteristics, but upon a tactical decision irrelevant to 
any proper objective of criminal proceedings. In contested cases, it 
substitutes a regime of split-the-difference for a judicial determination of 
guilt or innocence and elevates a concept of partial guilt above the 
requirement that criminal responsibility be established beyond a 
reasonable doubt. It also deprecates the value of human liberty and the 
purposes of the criminal sanction by treating these things as 
commodities to be traded for economic savings—savings that, when 
measured against common social expenditures, usually seem minor; see 
also, Katherine J. Strandburg, Deterrence and the Conviction of Innocents, 35 
Conn. L. Rev. 1321, 1336 (2003) (using an economic model of costs and 
benefits to review law enforcement strategies to suggest that the 
widespread use of plea bargaining may in fact decrease deterrence); 
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 Yale L.J. 1979, 1992 
(1992) (challenging the contract defense of plea bargaining); Daniel 
Givelber, Punishing Protestations of Innocence: Denying Responsibility and 
Its Consequences, 37 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1363, 1364-71, 1384 (2000) 
(contending that plea bargaining unfairly punishes virtually everyone 
who insists upon trial); Dervan and Edkins, The Innocent Defendant’s 
Dilemma: An Innovative Empirical Study of Plea Bargaining’s Innocence 
Problem 103 Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 1 (2012) (discussing 
a study involving school children in which more than half of the 
innocent participants were willing to falsely admit guilt for a benefit). 
 
48 See, e.g., Albert Alschuler, Lafler and Frye: Two Small Band-Aids for a 
Festering Wound, 51 Duq. L. Rev. 673 (noting that the plea bargaining 
system subjects defense attorneys to temptations to disregard their 
clients interests); Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of 
Trial, 117 Harv. L. R. 2463 (2004) (noting a lack of oversight of lawyers in 
the plea bargaining process); William Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal 
Laws Disappearing Shadow, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2548 (2004) (describing the 
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Proponents of plea bargaining counter that it promotes 
efficiency and autonomy, it is essential, according to its 
defenders, that criminal cases be resolved without trials.49  
They also maintain that despite the potentially coercive 
power placed in prosecutor’s hands, even an innocent 
defendant is better off when she chooses to plead guilty in 
order to assure a more lenient result if she concludes that 
there is a risk of wrongful conviction at trial.50 By allowing a 
defendant to choose whether to accept a plea bargain or take 
their chances at trial, the rational defendant (so the theory 
goes) will only choose to plead guilty if the chances of being 
found guilty are high (or process costs are high compared to 
the costs of a guilty plea). Therefore, according to this school 
of thought, even innocent defendants gain from plea 
bargaining. A further advantage of the plea bargaining 
system is said to be respect for an individual’s autonomy in 
that it gives the defendant some ability to control her 
destiny.51 
 
Relying on the consensual nature of the practice, the 
Supreme Court, as noted above, has praised plea bargaining 
as benefiting all participants in the criminal justice system as 
                                                                                                                                  
criminal law as a “menu” of options which prosecutors can use to dictate 
the terms of plea bargains). 
 
49
 See, e.g., Santobello v New York 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (“"…the 
disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor 
and the accused, sometimes loosely called ‘plea bargaining’ is an 
essential component of the administration of justice...If every criminal 
charge were subjected to a full scale trial, the States and the Federal 
Government would need to multiply by many times the number of 
judges and court facilities.”) 
 
50 Josh Bowers, Punishing The Innocent, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1117 (2008), 
1158-1159. 
 
51 Joseph Goldstein, For Harold Lasswell: Some Reflections on Human 
Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 84 Yale L.J. 
683, 685 (1975) (arguing that the rules governing plea bargaining “are 
rooted in a basic commitment . . . to respect human dignity by protecting 
the right of every adult to determine what he shall do and what may be 
done to him”). 
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well as the public.52 The Court has focused on the supposed 
benefits, even in cases where there is strong evidence of 
vindictive treatment and coercive tactics.  For example, in 
Bordenkircher v Hayes,53 Justice Stewart’s majority opinion 
defended the practice against a challenge based on the 
prosecutor’s decision to increase the charges with “unique 
severity”54 against a defendant who refused to plead guilty.  
Hayes was indicted for uttering a forged instrument in the 
amount of $88.30.  The prosecutor offered Hayes a term of 
five years imprisonment in exchange for a guilty plea.55  
Hayes, believing five years was excessive given the modest 
amount of funds illegally obtained, turned it down.  Because 
Hayes had two prior felony convictions for similar offenses, 
the prosecutor then indicted Hayes, as he had promised he 
would, under the Kentucky Habitual Criminal Act.  Hayes 
was convicted and sentenced to the mandatory term of life 
imprisonment with the possibility of parole.56  Hayes argued 
that the prosecutor’s actions were vindictive and thus 
violated the Due Process Clause.  The Supreme Court 
rejected Hayes’ due process challenge, even though the 
prosecutor conceded that he charged Hayes as a habitual 
criminal for the purpose of inducing a plea.57 Despite 
previous decisions establishing that state practices designed 
to discourage the assertion of constitutional rights, including 
                                                          
52 Santobello, supra, at 261 (“Disposition of charges after plea 
discussions… leads to prompt and largely final disposition of most 
criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced 
idleness during pretrial confinement for those who are denied release 
pending trial; it protects the public from those accused persons who are 
prone to continue criminal conduct even while on pretrial release; and, 
by shortening the time between charge and disposition, it enhances 
whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are 
ultimately imprisoned”). 
 
53434 U.S. 357 (1978).  
 
54 Id. at 372. 
 
55 Id.  
 
56 Id. at 359. 
 
57 Id. at 370 
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the right to jury trial, are “patently unconstitutional,”58 the 
Court determined that since the prosecutor could have 
legitimately charged Hayes under the Habitual Criminal Act 
initially had he chosen to do so, it was not vindictive (in the 
constitutional sense) to use the act to induce the plea after 
Hayes rejected the initial offer.  Justice Stewart’s majority 
opinion also hailed the virtues of plea bargaining: “properly 
administered plea bargaining can benefit all concerned,” and 
described plea bargaining as “give and take” negotiations 
between sides with relatively equal bargaining power.59 
Emphasizing mutual advantage, with both sides gaining by 
agreements to persuade defendants to plead to lesser 
charges, the Court stated that it is completely legitimate for a 
prosecutor to “induce [pleas] by promises of a 
recommendation of a lenient sentence or reduction of 
charged and thus by fear of the possibility of a greater 
penalty upon conviction after a trial,”60  
 
But saying it is so, even if it is the Supreme Court that 
says it, does not make it so. In many cases, there is no true 
mutuality of advantage, or true free choice for defendants 
given the highly coercive nature of the practice.  As others 
have noted, Hayes allows a prosecutor to apply leverage by 
filing charges that would not have been brought against the 
defendant absent plea bargaining considerations and which 
no one, including the prosecutor that levies them, believes 
are appropriate.61 Superficially, the defendant appears to 
receive a benefit if the prosecutor agrees to dismiss the 
added charges in exchange for a guilty plea, but the benefit 
                                                          
58 See, Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32 n. 20a 
 
59Hayes, supra at 362 
 
60Id. at 363 
 
61 Stephen Ross, Ignoring Prosecutorial Abuse in Plea Bargaining, 66 Cal. L. 
Rev. 875, 879 (1978); see also William Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal 
Law’s Disappearing Shadow, supra (“Criminal law is different. Its primary 
role is not to define obligations, but to create a menu of options for 
prosecutors. If the menu is long enough – and it usually is – prosecutors 
can dictate the terms of plea bargains. When that is so, litigants…bargain 
in the shadow of prosecutors preferences, budget constraints, and 
political trends”). 
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is, in reality, illusory. Innocent defendants, even those who 
are unlikely to be found guilty at trial, are pleading guilty.62 
 
The lack of advantage to many innocent defendants is 
exacerbated by the fact that prosecutors often offer the 
strongest incentives to defendants in cases where the 
evidence is weakest, as it is necessary to do so to secure a 
conviction.63 Here, the mutuality of advantage argument 
does not work as prosecutors can extract a guilty plea in 
almost any case, regardless of the defendant’s guilt or 
innocence, by dramatically changing the cost-benefit 
analysis.64 Rarely will a defendant refuse to consider any 
plea offer at all. Many defendants, even innocent ones, are 
willing to accept a lesser punishment in return for avoiding 
the risk of a much harsher sentence following conviction 
                                                          
62
 See Michael O Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis of Guilty Plea Practices 
in the Federal Courts, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 293 (1975) (concluding that more 
than two-thirds of “marginal” plea bargain defendants would be 
acquitted or dismissed if they were to contest their cases). 
 
63 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 50, 59-65 (1968) (suggesting that prosecutors offer the best 
bargains in weak cases, including ones in which defendant may be 
innocent); see also James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial 
Power, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1521 (1981), at 1534-35 (explaining why 
prosecutors are likely to offer the greatest incentives for those defendants 
with the greatest chance of acquittal at trial); Welsh S. White, A Proposal 
for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 439 (1971) at 
451 (“According to Martin Erdman, New York prosecutors often reduce 
their sentence recommendations by at least fifty percent if they believe 
that there is a fifty percent chance of a hung jury, and by a great deal 
more if they believe that there is a fifty percent chance of acquittal”). 
 
64The coercive nature of pleas can be illustrated by looking at the 
sentencing results in cases where defendants plead guilty compared to 
sentences imposed on defendants convicted at trial. Beverley Cook 
found, for example, that persons charged with violations of the Federal 
Selective Service Act who were convicted at jury trials received sentences 
about twice as severe as offenders who pled guilty (Cook, Sentencing 
Behavior of Federal Judges: Draft Cases 1972, 42 U. Cin. L. Rev. 597, 609 
(Table 3) (1973)) and Hans Zeisel found that the sentences of New York 
City defendants convicted at trial were 136% more severe than those 
proposed by prosecutors in pretrial offers to the same defendants.  
(Zeisel, The Offer That Cannot Be Refused, in F ZIMRING & R FRASE, THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, MATERIALS ON THE ADMINISTRATION AND 
REFORM OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 558, 561 (1980). 
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(even if the risk is very small).65 Thus prosecutors can extract 
guilty pleas even from defendants who are likely to be found 
not guilty at trial.66 These defendants do not benefit from the 
plea in any genuine sense. This is an especially effective 
tactic in cases where capital punishment is a potential 
sentencing option.  The possibility of being sentenced to 
death, even if it is remote, can lead defendants, even 
innocent ones, to plead guilty to get the death penalty “off 
the table.”67 
 
And, the theoretical mutuality of advantage is 
virtually non-existent in this context.  The reality is that there 
is little defense counsel can do to protect their clients. 
Prosecutors have the clear and undeniable upper hand; they 
can overcharge, leverage overbroad laws, exploit the 
information imbalance, wear down the defendant with 
(often extended) pre-trial incarceration and top it off with 
the possibility of a draconian sentence to shape the bargain 
in such cases.68  
                                                          
65
 See Russel D Covey, Longitudinal Guilt: Repeat Offenders, Plea 
Bargaining, and the Variable Standard of Proof, 63 FLA Rev 431, 450, (2011), 
(“When the deal is good enough, it is rational to refuse to roll the dice, 
regardless of whether one believes the evidence establishes guilty 
beyond reasonable doubt, and regardless of whether one is factually 
innocent. The risk of inaccurate results in the plea bargaining system 
thus seems substantial”); Donald G Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea 
Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U.Ill. L. Rev. 37, 49 
(“The reality of sentencing differentials is generally enough to deprive 
defendants of any real choice in plea bargaining”).   
 
66 See Finkelstein, supra (concluding that more than two-thirds of 
“marginal” plea bargain defendants would be acquitted or dismissed if 
they were to contest their cases). 
 
67 See Hugo A. Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in 
Potentially Capital Cases, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 21, 63 (1987) (reviewing five 
cases in which innocent defendants pled guilty in order to avoid the risk 
of a death sentence), see also http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/01/us/ 
released-but-not-exonerated-kerry-max-cook-fights-for-true-freedom. 
html?r=2&hp (describing the case of Kerry Max Cook). 
 
68 See Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon Skepticism, 70 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 
1049, 1065-66 (2013) (noting that mandatory minimum sentences and 
heavy trial penalties often pressure defendants into pleading guilty no 
matter how good their lawyers are, the structural challenges of fair plea 
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The Curious Case of the Alford Plea 
 
Further evidence of the criminal justice system’s 
addiction to guilty pleas (even in cases where a defendant 
might be innocent) can be found in the Supreme Court’s 
decision in North Carolina v Alford.69 Henry Alford was 
charged with first degree murder. The prosecution 
announced its intention to seek the death penalty.  Then, the 
state offered Alford a deal. If he pled guilty to second degree 
murder, he would be sentenced to a term of imprisonment.  
Alford took it.  During the plea colloquy, he adamantly 
insisted that he was innocent, and that he was only pleading 
guilty because of the substantial down side risks.70 When the 
case reached the Supreme Court, it held that defendants may 
knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty, even while 
protesting their innocence, if the judge determines there is 
“strong evidence of actual guilt.”71 The plea was not 
constitutionally defective, even though Alford’s primary 
motivation for the plea was avoiding the death penalty,72 
because the standard for determining the validity of guilty 
pleas “remains whether the plea represents a voluntary and 
intelligent choice among the alternative course of action 
open to the defendant.”73 
 
While the Alford plea was not officially acknowledged 
by the Supreme Court until 1970, nolo contendere pleas, also 
grounded in not admitting guilt, have existed since medieval 
times.74 Nolo contendere (or no contest) pleas originated 
                                                                                                                                  
bargaining far exceed the question of counsel’s performance in 
individual cases). 
 
69 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). 
 
70 Id. at 27-28 
 
71 Id. at 37-38 
 
72 Id. at 31 
 
73 Id. at 31 
 
74 Warren Moise, Sailing Between the Scilla and Charybdis: Nolo Contendere 
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from a procedure whereby a defendant, hoping to avoid 
imprisonment, tried to end the prosecution by offering 
money to the King without admitting guilt.75 Although the 
practical consequences of the two pleas are basically the 
same, Alford and nolo contendere pleas differ in two 
respects.76 First, unlike Alford pleas, nolo contendere pleas 
generally avoid estoppel in later litigation. Second, 
defendants who plead nolo contendere simply refuse to 
admit guilt, while defendants making Alford pleas 
affirmatively protest their innocence. The Supreme Court 
determined there was no constitutional difference between 
the pleas because “the Constitution is concerned with the 
practical consequences, not the formal categorizations, of 
state law.”77 Today, forty-seven states permit Alford pleas.78  
 
When one steps back a bit from the world as we 
currently know it, the Alford plea is a curious legal construct.  
It permits someone who insists that they are innocent to 
plead guilty to a crime they do not acknowledge 
committing; guilty but not guilty.  One would think that if a 
defendant says he did not commit the crime, the criminal 
justice system would insist on a trial to resolve the question.  
Although there is some efficiency gained by allowing Alford 
pleas; the primary one being that it allows guilty defendants 
to plea bargain while saving face with their spouses, 
children, parents and/or friends,79 the device provides 
                                                                                                                                  
and Alford Pleas, S.C law, May 17, 2006, at 10 (citing F. POLLACK & F. 
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 517 (2d ed. 1909)). 
 
75 Id. 
 
76 Claire Molesworth, Knowledge Versus Acknowledgement: Rethinking the 
Alford Plea in Sexual Assault Cases, 6 Seattle J. Soc. Just. 907, 912 (2008).  
 
77 Alford, supra at 37.  
 
78 Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and 
Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 Corn. 
L. Rev. 1361, 1372 (2003). 
 
79 Proof of this lies in the fact that Alford pleas are most commonly used 
in cases involving sexual assault, violence and white collar crime.  
Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and 
Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas. Id.  
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additional incentives for factually innocent defendants to 
plead as they can receive the benefits of a guilty plea without 
having to falsely admit guilt.  Alford pleas, therefore, 
exacerbate the risk of truly innocent defendants pleading 
guilty. 
 
III. Why Do Innocent Defendants Plead Guilty? 
 
In an ideal world, factually innocent defendants 
would not be charged with crimes they did not commit. In 
that same world, innocent defendants who were wrongly 
charged would never plead guilty, but would go to trial and 
be acquitted by a jury of their peers. But that is not the world 
we live in.   We now know, for example, due to the 
availability of DNA testing, that at least twenty-nine 
individuals who pled guilty to crimes they did not commit 
served a combined total of more than one hundred and fifty 
years in prison before their exonerations.80 Why do they do 
it?  
 
There are three principal reasons why innocent 
defendants plead guilty.  First, innocent persons charged 
with relatively minor offenses often plead guilty in order to 
get out of jail, to avoid the hassle of having criminal charges 
hanging over their heads, or to avoid being punished for 
exercising their right to trial. Second, defendants who were 
wrongfully convicted, but have their conviction vacated on 
direct appeal or in post-conviction review proceedings, 
plead guilty to receive a sentence of time served and obtain 
their immediate (or at least imminent) freedom. Third, some 
                                                                                                                                  
 
80 See http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/When_the_Innocent 
_Plead_Guilty.php. The Innocent Project estimate that false confessions 
are involved in about 25% of wrongful convictions that are later 
overturned by DNA testing. To give a few examples, John Dixon pled 
guilty in 1991 to a rape he did not commit and spent ten years in prison 
before being exonerated by DNA evidence, Christiopher Ochoa pled 
guilty in 1989 to a murder he did not commit and spent nearly twelve 
years in prison before DNA testing led to his exoneration and Jerry 
Frank Townsend pled guilty in the 1970s to six murders and one rape 
and served nearly twenty-two years in prison before DNA testing led to 
his exoneration.  
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innocent defendants plead guilty due to the fear of a harsh 
alternative punishment, e.g., the death penalty.81  
 
A. Defendants charged with minor or relatively 
minor offenses. 
 
The largest category is the first; innocent persons 
charged with relatively minor offences.  Spend time talking 
to any “front line” public defender or persons in our poorest 
communities and they will tell you that many innocent 
defendants charged with relatively minor crimes plead 
guilty in order to get out of jail or avoid spending additional 
time in jail. In many of these cases, the defendants do not 
have a constitutional right to an attorney or a jury trial, and, 
especially if they are incarcerated pre-trial, will plead guilty 
just to get out of jail.82 The incentives are quite strong; most 
of these defendants are poor, and thus unable to afford 
bond, retain counsel or care for their families.  In many 
instances, they already have some kind of criminal record, 
and in the communities in which they live the stigma of a 
                                                          
81
 There are also potential (but likely smaller) fourth and fifth categories 
of cases in which innocent defendants plead guilty, which we will not 
discuss in detail here.  The fourth category consists of innocent 
defendants who have a prior conviction but whose only chance of 
acquittal at trial is to testify in their own defense.  But, due to the very 
real fear that they will be impeached with the prior conviction and the 
jury will – despite instructions to the contrary – draw a propensity 
inference from the prior conviction that the defendant is guilty, the 
defendant elects to plead guilty.  See John H Blume, The Dilemma of the 
Criminal Defendant with a Prior Record – Lessons from the Wrongfully 
Convicted, 5 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 477 (2008) (noting 
numerous instances of innocent defendants who did not testify in their 
own defense – some of whom pled guilty – because they had a prior 
conviction). The fifth category consists of innocent defendants who make 
false confessions due to coercive interrogation by the police and plead 
guilty, on advice of counsel, due to the difficulty in persuading jurors 
that people do, in fact, confess to crimes they did not commit. See 
Douglas Starr, Do police interrogation techniques produce false confessions?, 
The New Yorker, December 9 2013, http://www.newyorker.com/ 
reporting/2013/12/09/131209fa_fact_starr. 
 
82
 Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. Cal. L. Rev, 101, 134-135 
(2012) (describing the pressure on defendants accused of misdemeanors 
to plead guilty to get out of jail). 
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criminal conviction, especially for a minor offense, is low. 
Even if they are released on bail, the trial will not be for 
months, possibly longer, and it is often inconvenient or 
expensive to go to court for things like “roll-call.”   And, 
they frequently know, and will be advised, that if they reject 
a favorable plea and are found guilty, the judge will punish 
them for exercising their right to trial.83  Thus, many 
defendants will do whatever it takes to get out of jail or 
avoid a trial; including pleading guilty to a crime they did 
not commit.   
 
Erma Faye Stewart, for example, was thirty and a 
single mother of two when she was arrested as part of a 
drug sweep based on the word of a confidential informant. 84 
With no one to take care of her two small children, Stewart 
decided to plead guilty to delivery of a controlled substance. 
She was sentenced to ten years probation, and she was 
required to pay $1800 in fines and report to her parole officer 
monthly, an hour later, she was released.85 The confidential 
informant was later exposed as a fraud and the charges were 
dropped against the other defendants charged in the sweep, 
who had not pled guilty.86 The reality is that, for many 
defendants like Erma Stewart, a guilty plea often represents 
the only readily available key to the cellblock door.  
 
These defendants can be significantly harmed by their 
convictions.87 Their criminal records can deprive them of 
                                                          
83
 See Candace McCoy, Plea Bargaining as Coercion: The Trial Penalty and 
Plea Bargaining Reform, 50 Crim. L. Q. 67 (2005) (describing the 
magnitude of the “trial penalty” whereby harsher sentences are imposed 
on a defendant who has been convicted after trial than would have been 
imposed had she pled guilty). 
 
84See http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plea/four/ 
stewart.html 
 
85 Id. 
 
86 Id. Stewart’s attempts to invalidate her guilty plea were rebuffed by 
the courts. 
 
87 See Michelle Alexander, Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System, N.Y. Times, 
March 10 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/opinion/ 
sunday/go-to-trial-crash-the-justice-system.html?_r=0, describing Erma 
Faye Stewart’s case (Ms. Stewart was saddled with a felony record; she 
    THE UNEXONERATED                                            
 
 
 
24
employment as well as educational and social opportunities 
and a minor conviction can affect eligibility for professional 
licenses, child custody, food stamps, student loans and 
health care.88 
  
B. Defendants who prevail during the appellate 
process 
 
Second, innocent defendants who are wrongfully 
convicted and then win a new trial, may plead guilty in 
order to secure their immediate or imminent release. This 
was true of the West Memphis Three, and, under the right 
circumstances can be an appealing option to an innocent 
defendant. Why? Think about it from the wrongfully 
convicted person’s perspective. They have been to trial and, 
despite knowing they were innocent, the jury found them 
guilty. Having seen the criminal justice system in operation, 
“up close and personal” so to speak, it is not hard to imagine 
that such a defendant would be reluctant to “roll the dice” at 
a retrial.89 Even in cases where new evidence has come to 
light, e.g., the DNA evidence in the case of the West 
Memphis Three, the prosecution will often attempt to 
bargain with the defendants in order to secure a guilty plea 
and maintain the conviction.  Most prosecutors and law 
enforcement officers are hostile to  post- conviction claims of 
innocence.90  This has been described as a “conviction 
psychology” which leads prosecutors and police to resist 
claims of innocence in order to maintain the integrity of the 
criminal justice system (by not admitting that the system had 
                                                                                                                                  
was destitute, barred from food stamps, evicted from public housing and 
as a result had her children placed in foster care). 
 
88
 Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra, at 104. 
 
89 See Russel Covey, supra (“When the deal is good enough, it is rational 
to refuse to roll the dice, regardless of whether one believes the evidence 
establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and regardless of whether 
one is factually innocent.”)  
 
90 Daniel Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance To Post-
Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84. B.U. L. Rev. 125(2010) (analyzing the 
institutional and political factors deterring prosecutors from accepting 
the legitimacy of post-conviction innocence claims). 
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made a mistake), improve their own chances of promotion 
(by maintaining conviction rates), and avoid wasting time 
(as they still believe defendants are guilty regardless of how 
persuasive the evidence of innocence is).91 Therefore, 
prosecutors will often offer highly coercive deals involving 
immediate or near immediate release from jail to secure a 
conviction.  
 
The West Memphis Three is not the only recent 
example of this sad reality. We will briefly discuss several 
instances where this happened.92  Sterling Spann was 
convicted of the murder and sexual assault of an elderly 
widow, Melva Neill, in 1981.  The jury sentenced him to 
death.93  During the post-conviction investigation, a private 
investigator discovered that exactly sixty days before Ms. 
Neill was brutally murdered, another elderly white woman 
was killed in the same rural area pursuant to the same modus 
operandi (the victim was sexually assaulted, strangled, and 
left in the bathtub).  The same investigator discovered that 
exactly sixty days after the Neill murder, a third elderly 
white female was sexually assaulted and strangled (she had 
no bathtub but fluid was poured on the body).94  Further 
investigation revealed that a paranoid schizophrenic, Johnny 
Hullett, was convicted of killing the third victim. When 
interviewed by members of Spann’s defense team, Hullett 
insisted Spann was innocent and acknowledged his own 
involvement in the murders.95  One of the leading forensic 
pathologists in the world, Werner Spitz, examined all three 
                                                          
91
 Id. In some cases, the plea is extracted to prevent the defendant from 
bringing a civil action.  
 
92
 In two of which, in the interest of full disclosure, the Cornell Capital 
punishment Clinic served as counsel of record for the defendant. 
 
93 Keith Morrison, A 20 year quest for freedom, NBC news, June 11 2007, 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/19161103/ns/dateline_nbc-
crime_reports/t/-year-quest-freedom/#.Uij_KamgQts 
 
94 State v Spann, 334 S.C. 618, 620 (1999).  Spann had been arrested and 
was incarcerated at the time of the third homicide. 
  
95
 Keith Morrison, A 20 year quest for freedom, supra.  
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autopsy reports and concluded that given the unique nature 
of the strangulation in all three cases, the murders were 
committed by one person.96  Leading criminal profilers 
including the chief former FBI profiler, also concluded that 
the crimes were committed by one person and that Hullett, 
not Spann, matched the profile.97 Furthermore, the 
fingerprint and serological evidence that led to Spann’s 
conviction at trial was tainted.  Even the State’s fingerprint 
examiner conceded that the prosecution’s theory of how 
Spann’s prints were left at the scene was “impossible.”98  
Given this new evidence of innocence, the South Carolina 
Supreme Court ordered a new trial.99  
 
Prior to the retrial, the prosecution offered to allow 
Spann to enter an Alford plea making him immediately 
eligible for parole; the prosecution also agreed that it would 
not oppose parole.  Having spent twenty years on death 
row, Spann, who had been out on bond for more than a year 
prior to the scheduled trial, decided to take the deal.100 His 
sister, who had been his “rock” during the many years he 
was incarcerated, had recently been killed in an automobile 
accident.101  And, one of his best friends on death row, 
Richard Johnson, was executed, despite Johnson’s strong 
claim of factual innocence.102  Devastated by his sister’s 
                                                          
96
 State v Spann, 334 S.C. 618, supra, at 621. 
 
97 Id.  
 
98
 Keith Morrison, A 20 year quest for freedom, supra. 
 
99 State v Spann, 334 S.C. 618, supra.  
 
100
 Id.  
 
101 Id.  
 
102 See Johnson v. Catoe, 548 SE 2d 587 (2001). The South Carolina 
Supreme Court rejected, by a 3-2 vote, Johnson’s final appeal which was 
based on newly discovered evidence of innocence despite the fact that 
one of Johnson’s co-defendants admitted that they committed the 
murder (see 548 SE 2d at 594).  Governor Jim Hodges then denied 
Johnson’s request for clemency despite the fact that the victim’s widow 
asked the Governor to commute the sentence, as did the state senator 
from the district in which the crime occurred, based on the new 
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death, and frightened by Johnson’s execution, Spann 
decided he needed to put the matter behind him, plead 
guilty and secure his freedom.103  His attorneys, one of 
whom is a co-author of this article, concurred in Spann’s 
decision.   
 
Edward Lee Elmore recently made a similar choice.104   
Elmore was convicted in Greenwood County, South 
Carolina 1982 of the rape and murder of a woman for whom 
he worked as a “yard-man.”  His conviction was reversed on 
direct appeal,105 but he was convicted and sentenced to 
death a second time.  On appeal from that conviction and 
death sentence, a third trial was ordered (but this time only 
on the issue of punishment), and Elmore was again 
sentenced to death.106 After years of appeals, he was (finally) 
granted a new trial by a panel of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in December of 2011.107 
Despite being one of the, if not the most conservative federal 
court of appeals in the United States,108 Elmore’s panel 
described the case as illustrating “extreme malfunctions in 
the state criminal justice system.”109 The court of appeals 
                                                                                                                                  
evidence.  Hodges received 1850 letters and emails asking for clemency 
for Johnson (see Jim Davenport, Hodges denies clemency, trooper’s killer to 
die today, The Post and Courier, May 3 2002).  
 
103Keith Morrison, A 20 year quest for freedom, supra. We would note that 
Spann is successfully employed as a car mechanic in Charlotte, North 
Carolina, and he is still happily married to the woman he met (and 
married) while incarcerated on death row.  
    
104 Raymond Bonner, When Innocence Isn’t Enough, N.Y. Times, March 2 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/04/opinion/sunday/when-
innocence-isnt-enough.html?pagewanted=all 
 
105 State v Elmore 308 S.E. 2d 781 (1983). 
 
106
 State v Elmore 332 S.E.2d 762 (1985) 
 
107 Elmore v Ozmint 661 F.3d 783 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 
108 See John H. Blume, The Dance of Death or (Almost) “No One Gets Out of 
Here Alive”: The Fourth Circuit’s Capital Punishment Jurisprudence, 61 S.C. 
Law Rev. 465 (2010). 
 
109 Elmore v Ozmint, supra, at 786 
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also described the prosecution’s case as “underwhelming,” 
“flimsy” and indicative of “police ineptitude and deceit.”110 
 
Following the Fourth Circuit’s decision, the 
prosecution offered Elmore a deal; he could plead guilty 
pursuant to Alford in exchange for time served and 
immediate release.  With the alternative being a year or more 
in jail prior to a retrial and then having to face a fourth jury, 
Elmore, with some reluctance, accepted the plea offer and 
walked out of a maximum security prison several days 
later.111  In this case too, his lawyers agreed with his 
decision.  Public reaction to the plea was mixed, with most 
agreeing that the plea was unfair.  The New York Times, for 
example, published an editorial entitled, “When innocence is 
not enough.”112  Elmore, who is happy to no longer be 
incarcerated, spent more than thirty years in prison for a 
crime he did not commit, and has not, and will never be, 
truly “exonerated.”113  
                                                                                                                                  
 
110 Elmore v Ozmint, supra, at 871. 
 
111 Jeffrey Collins and Meg Kinnard,, Ex-Death Row inmate walks out a free 
man, The State, March 3 2012, http://www.thestate.com/2012/03/03/ 
2175467/ex-death-row-inmate-walks-out.html 
 
112 Raymond Bonner, When Innocence Isn’t Enough, N.Y. Times, March 2 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/04/opinion/sunday/when-
innocence-isnt-enough.html?pagewanted=all 
 
113 A “new” member has recently joined the unexonerated in this 
category of case.  George Souliotes spent nearly 17 years in prison after 
being found guilty of a triple murder for allegedly starting a fire that 
killed three people.  A federal court granted the writ of habeas corpus 
and vacated his conviction finding that the arson evidence was 
scientifically flawed and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
adequately challenge it (Souliotes v Grounds, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
32717 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2013).  The prosecution then offered Souliotes a 
deal: he would be immediately released if he pled no contest to three 
counts of involuntary manslaughter for failure to maintain working 
smoke detectors (even though the house did have a smoke alarm).  What 
is most striking is that the prosecution conceded there was no evidence 
that the fire had been started deliberately.  In other words, there was no 
evidence that the “crime” Souliotes pled guilty to was – in fact – a crime.  
Nevertheless, Souliotes agreed to the “deal” and the trial judge accepted 
it (see Maura Dolan, Arson Convict Proves His Innocence After 16 Years 
Behind Bars, L.A Times, July 3 2013, http://www.latimes.com/local/la-
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C. Avoiding harsh alternative punishments. 
 
Finally, factually innocent defendants may plead 
guilty because they are afraid that they will be punished 
(often quite severely) for exercising the Sixth Amendment 
right to jury trial.  In many murder cases, for example, the 
prosecution will threaten the defendant with capital 
punishment if he does not plead guilty.114  After being 
notified that the prosecution was seeking the death penalty 
against them, Phillip Bivens and Bobby Ray Dixon pled 
guilty to a 1979 Mississippi rape and murder in exchange for 
a sentence of life imprisonment.   In 2010, DNA testing 
                                                                                                                                  
me-c1-freed-prison-20131017-dto,0,2232794.htmlstory#axzz2kRWBOhRP 
). Souliotes apparently hoped the state would acknowledge he was 
wrongfully convicted and compensate him for his confinement but the 
plea ended any such possibility. (See Maura Dolan, Out of Prison and into 
the Unknown, L.A. Times, October 17 2013, 
http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-c1-freed-prison-20131017-dto,0, 
2232794.htmlstory). Other examples of defendants who have prevailed 
during the appellate process and then pled guilty include Kerry Max 
Cook and Sunny Jacobs. Cook’s case is particularly interesting as Cook 
has now been conclusively proven innocent. Cook was charged with, 
convicted of and sentenced to death for the brutal murder and rape of 
Linda Jo Edwards in Texas.  The post-conviction investigation revealed 
that the testimony of several key witnesses was perjured, and that the 
prosecution suppressed exculpatory evidence.  After Cook was granted a 
new trial, the prosecution offered a no contest plea in exchange for a 
sentence of time served.   Cook accepted.  Subsequently, DNA testing 
conclusively established Cook’s innocence.   Thus Cook was able to 
transition from the unexonerated to the exonerated (see 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plea/four/cook.ht
ml).   Sunny Jacobs was convicted and sentenced to death for the 1976 
murders of two law enforcement officers in Florida, a third co-defendant 
received a life sentence after pleading guilty and testifying against her 
and her partner. Following the discovery that the chief prosecution 
witness had given contradictory statements, the prosecutor proposed  an 
Alford plea which Jacobs accepted.  She was released in 1992 (see 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/additional-innocence-information).  
 
114See, James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 
2030, 2097 & n.165 (2000) and; Hugo A. Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, 
Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 21, 63 
(1987) (reviewing five cases in which innocent defendants pled guilty in 
order to avoid the risk of a death sentence). 
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conclusively established their innocence.115 This was also a 
factor in the West Memphis Three case; the fact that Damien 
Echols was on death row contributed to the decision of the 
three men to plead guilty.116  But even where death is not a 
sentencing option, prosecutors often have other potential 
harsh sentences, including lengthy terms of imprisonment, 
including life without parole as well as enhancements for 
second or third time offenders that can be used to induce 
reluctant defendants, even innocent ones, to plead guilty in 
exchange for a reduction in the amount of time that will 
have to be served.117 
 
IV. Reducing the Number of the Unexonerated? 
 
There is clearly a problem; in a fair criminal justice 
system innocent defendants would not plead guilty to 
crimes they did not commit.  But, they do.  We are not 
exactly sure how often it occurs, but the numbers are not so 
small that the phenomena can be dismissed as artifact.  On 
the other hand, it is possible that innocent defendants 
pleading guilty is simply the cost of doing plea business.  In 
                                                          
115 See http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/When_the_Innocent 
_Plead_Guilty.php (describing the case of Phillip Bivens and Bobby Ray 
Dixon, and other cases in which innocent defendants have pled guilty, 
usually to avoid the potential for a long sentence, or death). 
 
116 David Koon, Jason’s choice: friendship, freedom and a principled stand, 
supra. 
 
117
 See http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/James_Ochoa.php 
(describing the case of James Ochoa who pled guilty to a 2005 carjacking 
he did not commit to avoid a possible sentence of 25 years to life if 
convicted at trial. Ten months after his conviction, DNA testing proved 
his innocence).  Another former Cornell Capital Punishment Clinic 
client, Johnny Ringo Pearson was charged with murder and related 
offenses.  After nearly a decade of pre-trial litigation revolving around 
Pearson’s competency to stand trial, he was found to be a person with 
mental retardation and thus not eligible for the death penalty pursuant 
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 
(2002).   But, he was still facing a potential sentence of life imprisonment.  
The prosecution offered a plea bargain pursuant to which Pearson would 
be released after a relatively short additional term of imprisonment.  
Given the alternatives, Pearson was willing to accept the bargain despite 
strong evidence of factual innocence.  
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the South there is an old saying:  “People like sausage and 
justice; but no one likes to see how either one is really 
made.”  Maybe that is true in the plea bargaining context.  If 
the system must induce virtually all defendants, somehow 
and someway to plead guilty, then not only the guilty but 
also the innocent will in some instances agree to plead 
guilty. And, no feasible solutions come readily to mind.  This 
seems especially true for the persons charged with relatively 
minor offenses who plead guilty for time served to get out of 
jail.   But, we are not quite ready to throw up our hands and 
give up. So, let us briefly discuss some possibilities. 
  
First, the criminal justice system could eliminate plea 
bargaining.  While this is viewed by most people, including 
a majority of the current Supreme Court, as unthinkable, 
many European criminal justice systems do not allow the 
practice, and they manage their criminal dockets 
adequately.118  In a world without the ability to plea bargain, 
we would expect to see two adjustments benefitting 
innocent (and also guilty) defendants.  First, charges would 
be dismissed in more cases.  Without the ability to use many 
of the currently sanctioned highly coercive practices, 
prosecutors would dismiss weak cases rather than working 
to get the “best” deal possible.  And since, on average, weak 
cases are more closely associated with innocence, innocent 
defendants would benefit from a no-bargaining regime.  
Second, charging decisions would have to become more 
rational.  In today’s plea driven market, prosecutors have 
incentives to overcharge in order to start the “bidding” so to 
speak.119 Without the ability to bargain, however, 
prosecutors would be forced to charge more appropriately, 
at least in regard to the expected disposition of cases.  
Another benefit which would protect the innocent would be 
                                                          
118 WORLD PLEA BARGAINING: CONSENSUAL PROCEDURES AND THE 
AVOIDANCE OF THE FULL CRIMINAL TRIAL 344, 363-66 (S. Thaman ed. 
2010). 
 
119See Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial 
Reforms, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 150 (2012) (noting that the current charging 
system is akin to “sticker price” on a new car.  It is not intended to be the 
sale price, and only a fool would pay it.  Rather it is intentionally set at 
an (unreasonably) high price to facilitate the expected negotiations).     
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that the prosecutors would not be able to freely “purchase” 
the testimony of jailhouse informants with a dismissal or 
reduction in charges or sentence, thus eliminating a leading 
cause of wrongful convictions.120   
 
One of the authors of this article’s thinking regarding 
the morality and utility of plea bargaining has undergone a 
metamorphosis over the years. During his years as a full-
time practicing criminal defense lawyer, he fully embraced 
the conventional wisdom that pleas were essential. He could 
see the limitations of the “mutuality of advantage” rationale, 
but living inside the system prevented him from thinking 
outside of it. He now believes there is much to be said for 
jettisoning the plea driven system.  It places the enforcement 
of the criminal law in the hands of prosecutors and defense 
lawyers, does not make legislators accountable for their 
legislation (and thus promotes political posturing with 
draconian legislation) and has a corrosive effect on the 
attorney-client relationship.121 However, without 
modifications to current minimum/maximum punishment 
                                                          
120
 See ROB WARDEN, THE SNITCH SYSTEM: HOW INCENTIVIZED WITNESSES 
PUT 38 INNOCENT AMERICANS ON DEATH ROW, CENTER ON WRONGFUL 
CONVICTIONS, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW (2005), 
available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/SnitchSystem 
Booklet.pdf (describing informant testimony (often from jailhouse 
informants) as the “leading cause of wrongful convictions in U.S. capital 
cases”); see also Alexandra Natapoff, Beyond Unreliable, How Snitches 
Contribute to Wrongful Convictions, 37 Golden Gate U.L. Rev 107, 109- 111 
(presenting data on “snitch generated” wrongful convictions) (2006-
2007). 
 
121 Because most defendants are indigent, they are represented by public 
defenders or court appointed counsel.  Most of these attorneys have 
large caseloads and incentives to dispose of cases as quickly as possible 
with as little time spent on each case as possible.  Thus, the first 
conversation that many defendants have with their attorneys focuses on 
a plea, i.e., what can the client “live with.” (See AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST 
FOR EQUAL JUSTICE (2004), 16 at http://www.americanbar.org 
/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_s
claid_def_bp_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam.
pdf). This, understandably, leaves many defendants with the impression 
that their attorney: a) does not care whether they are innocent or guilty 
or whether their rights were violated; and, b) does not intend to conduct 
a factual investigation.  
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and sentencing regimes, which are, at least for the moment 
not viable, a non-plea bargaining world is not the solution, 
especially given that most of the rest of the world, again at 
least for now, is not prepared to eliminate the practice.122          
 
A similar, but more limited possibility would be not 
to allow Alford pleas.  It is, as we have previously noted, an 
odd thing that we allow defendants to plead guilty to crimes 
they insist they did not commit.  A rational criminal justice 
system, in our view, would respond to a denial of guilt with 
something resembling the following:  “ok, if you say you did 
not do it, we have a procedure for determining whether the 
evidence is sufficient to convict; it is called a trial.”  Doing 
away with Alford pleas would have the effect of forcing some 
innocent defendants to go to trial, where they would 
(hopefully) be acquitted.  And, in other cases, prosecutors 
would likely dismiss the charges instead of using the Alford 
plea to seal the deal.  But, on the other hand, Alford pleas do 
have a practical value.  They allow some guilty defendants 
to plead who would not otherwise do so to save face 
especially in cases involving sexual assaults (although that is 
a strange reason to embrace the practice), and guilty-but-not-
guilty pleas also permit some potentially innocent 
defendants who would be convicted at trial to obtain a better 
outcome (which is the equivalent of saying that a little less 
injustice beats more injustice).  The most significant objection 
                                                          
122 In fact, if anything, the Supreme Court has “constitutionalized” the 
status quo. Lafler v. Cooper, supra, 132 S.Ct. at 1397 (“the Court today 
opens a whole new field of constitutionalized criminal procedure: plea 
bargaining law”).   In three cases over the last several years the Court has 
found trial counsel ineffective for deficient performance in plea 
bargaining.  In Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S 356 (2010), 130 S.Ct.1473 (2010) 
the Court held that it was deficient performance to give the client 
erroneous advice regarding the immigration consequences arising from a 
guilty plea.  In Lafler, the Court found counsel’s performance deficient 
based on erroneous advice that resulted in the defendant rejecting a 
favorable plea in favor of going to trial (at which he was convicted and 
received a substantially more severe sentence).  And, in Missouri v. Frye, 
supra, counsel was found ineffective for failing to inform the defendant 
of a plea offer that lapsed.  The defendant later pled guilty, but in 
exchange for substantially less favorable terms.  In doing so, the Court 
stated that “the right to adequate assistance of counsel cannot be defined 
or enforced without taking account of the central role plea bargaining 
plays in securing convictions and determining sentences.”  132 S.Ct. at 
1388.    
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to this proposal, however, is that as long as plea bargaining 
in general is still available in the non-Alford context, the most 
likely result of eliminating the practice would be to simply 
drive cases now resolved by Alford pleas “underground” 
into the available plea bargaining market.  
  
Third, the criminal justice system could (and 
definitely should) require more judicial supervision of the 
plea bargaining process.  At one end of the spectrum, judges 
could be authorized to strike the death penalty as a potential 
punishment if the court thought it was being used only for, 
or primarily for, “plea extraction” purposes. But, this is 
likely to do little good.  Even assuming a judge acting in 
good faith,123 it is difficult to overcome the information gap 
problem.  How is a judge to know if the prosecutor is acting 
coercively or vindictively except in the most egregious 
cases?124  One possibility would be to adopt the model 
suggested by Justice Powell in his Hayes dissent, where he 
stated: “the question that must be asked is whether the 
prosecutor might have reasonably charged the respondent 
                                                          
123 We would also note the problem of judicial hostility to criminal 
defendants generally, especially in jurisdictions where judges are 
elected.  See Eric Sandberg-Zakian, Rethinking “Bias”: Judicial Elections and 
the Due Process Clause after Caperton v A.T. Massey Coal Company, 64 Ark. 
L. Rev. 179 (2010).  
 
124
 Another proposal we considered but ultimately opted not to advance 
was (substantially) more rigorous enforcement of Rule 3.8 of the 
American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which 
states: “The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: (a) refrain from prosecuting a 
charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause…”.  As 
our discussion of the West Memphis Three and George Souliotes cases 
illustrated, this rule is “honored in the breach.”  In theory, more vigorous 
enforcement of the rule would prevent some of the extremely coercive 
plea bargains offered in very weak cases.  This would be particularly 
relevant to cases classed in our second category (defendants who prevail 
during the appellate process).  However, as our colleague Brad Wendel 
pointed out, there is also the danger that any significant increase in 
disciplining prosecutors carries the significant risk of making the 
situation worse, not better.  This is true for two reasons. First, it 
encourages lead prosecutors to misrepresent the strength of cases to 
ensure the facial existence of probable cause. The second, and more  
important reason, is that it would discourage prosecutors from offering 
plea bargains to these defendants at all.   
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under the Act in the first place”.125 However, unfortunately 
even this may be unrealistic, judges are busy, dockets are 
crowded; in large urban areas the system is driven by the 
rule of “meat in/sausage out.” 
 
Another needed reform in the area of judicial 
supervision of plea bargaining is to allow trial and appellate 
courts to consider the “voluntariness” of the plea.  Current 
legal doctrine focuses myopically on whether the plea was 
knowing and intelligent.  This, in turn, focuses on questions 
like: was the defendant aware of the rights he was waiving 
by entering the plea (the right to jury trial, the right to 
testify, the right to confront witnesses)?126; was the 
defendant aware of nature of the charges he was pleading 
guilty to?127; was the defendant aware of the maximum 
punishment?128; and, was there a factual basis for the plea?129 
But very little attention is given to whether the plea was 
truly voluntary.  For example, the pleas entered by the West 
Memphis Three easily satisfied the knowing and intelligent 
inquiry.  But, that was not what was wrong with the pleas 
they were offered.  The problem was that virtually no 
rational defendant, even an innocent one, would turn the 
deal down.   Thus courts should recognize, and more 
importantly enforce, a voluntary guilty plea requirement.   
The right would be somewhat akin to a voluntariness 
challenge to an incriminating statement.  Current confession 
law doctrine uses a totality of the circumstances test and 
asks courts to inquire whether, considering the totality of the 
circumstances, the individual’s will was overborne by 
coercive interrogation practices.130  While this would be a 
step forward, it is not without significant downsides.  First, 
unless a court has the power not only to set aside the plea 
                                                          
125
 Hayes, supra, at 370. 
 
126 Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(B)-(F) 
 
127 Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(G). 
 
128 Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(H)-(J).  
 
129
 Fed. R. Crim. P 11(b)(3). 
 
130 See Colorado v. Connelley, 479 U.S. 157 (1986). 
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but also to dismiss the charges, then defendants like Spann 
and Elmore benefit little from being returned to the status 
quo ante.  Second, totality of the circumstances tests very 
rarely work to a criminal defendant’s benefit.  In the 
confession context, for example, voluntariness challenges are 
many, successful ones are very, very few.131    
  
Fourth, the current law in most jurisdictions barring a 
defendant from bringing a civil action if he pleads guilty 
could be modified.  Allowing civil suits even if a defendant 
pleads guilty would discourage the practice of forcing 
innocent defendants to plead guilty, or in some cases, would 
allow the individual to recoup some damages for the loss of 
liberty.  If the defendant prevailed in such a suit, it should 
also serve to restore a person’s civil rights.  However, the 
objections are many.  Guilty as well as innocent defendants 
would sue.  While, in many cases, courts could quickly 
separate the “wheat from the chafe,” the nuisance suit factor 
makes this effectively a non-starter.    
 
Fifth, in our second category of cases, where innocent 
defendants who are wrongfully convicted and then win a 
new trial plead guilty in order to secure their immediate or 
imminent release, a different prosecutor’s office could be 
assigned to the case after the appellate reversal. The new 
prosecutorial team, which in theory would not be as 
invested in again securing a conviction, would decide 
whether to dismiss the case, offer a plea or go forward with 
the prosecution. This might help to reduce the effect of 
institutional and political factors that prevent prosecutors 
accepting the legitimacy of post-conviction innocence 
claims132 and therefore encourage weak cases to be 
dismissed rather than settled through plea bargaining. 
However, again we are skeptical. Prosecutors are a “tight 
knit” group and will be reluctant to earn the ire of their 
                                                          
131 See Missouri v Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 609 (2004) (stating that it takes 
“unusual stamina” to maintain a statement is involuntary if authorities 
have adhered to Miranda dictates and that “litigation over voluntariness 
tends to end with the finding of a valid waiver”).  
 
132 See Daniel Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance To Post-
Conviction Claims of Innocence, supra. 
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current or former prosecutorial colleagues (or law 
enforcement officers) by dismissing the charges. 
 
As our penultimate suggestion, we offer a more 
detailed proposal that – to our knowledge – has not 
previously been suggested in the literature.  That is the use 
of citizen panels to review guilty pleas after the fact in cases 
where defendants allege they pled guilty to a crime they did 
not commit. If this procedure were adopted, defendants who 
plead guilty pre-trial in exchange for time served (or some 
nominal additional punishment) would, upon request, have 
their claim of innocence reviewed by a citizen review 
panel.133 This would allow defendants to take the benefit of 
the guilty plea (which as we have described above they will 
often be forced to do) while still providing a forum for them 
to make the case that they were in fact innocent and explain 
why they pled guilty to a crime they did not commit.  
 
Citizen review panels and boards are already used in 
the United States in two main areas: allegations of police 
misconduct;134 and, child welfare citizen review boards, to 
ensure child welfare.135 These are independent boards 
comprised of civilians, and while not courts, they do hear 
cases, make objective determinations and have the authority 
to make recommendations. For example police review 
boards usually hear allegations of police misconduct made 
by the public and recommend sanctions for officer 
misconduct to the Chief of Police, Mayor and/or City 
Council who can then implement the sanctions. Boards often 
have the power to subpoena people, documents and other 
                                                          
133
 A possible variation of this would be review by a panel of retired 
judges.  But for reasons that follow, we prefer to utilize private citizens.  
 
134
 See for e.g., the Las Vegas Citizen Review Board 
https://www.citizenreviewboard.com/, the Pittsburgh Citizen Review 
Board http://www.city.pittsburgh.pa.us/cprb/, the Atlanta Citizens 
Review Board http://acrbgov.org/ and the San Diego Citizens Review 
Board http://www.sandiego.gov/citizensreviewboard/ 
 
135 See for e.g., the New Mexico Child Abuse and Neglect Citizen Review 
Board http://www.nmcrb.org/ and Oregon’s Foster Care Review Board 
http://courts.oregon.gov/OJD/OSCA/cpsd/citizenreview/index.page  
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evidence.136 Different review boards have different 
procedures by which members are appointed to the boards, 
for example some boards are elected by officials137 and other 
boards appoint members from public volunteers.138 
 
In the case of review of guilty pleas of persons 
alleging innocence, one easy to implement option would be 
to select a panel of citizens from those called for jury service.  
Potential jurors are usually selected at random from lists of 
those who are registered to vote and/or have a driver’s 
license.139 Most potential jurors are not actually selected to 
serve on a jury because most criminal cases plead and civil 
cases settle.140 Instead of having these members of the public 
effectively sit around and for the most part wait to be 
selected for a jury (i.e., do nothing), some could serve on a 
“plea review board.”   
 
Review would not tantamount to a full trial and 
would and should not be overly formalistic given that most 
defendants will not be able to afford counsel. Instead, upon a 
defendant’s request, the panel would be presented with 
summary materials about the case (i.e., the arrest warrants 
and indictment(s)/information, the sentencing range for the 
alleged crimes charged, the sentencing range for the crime(s) 
to which the defendant pled, the sentence imposed and how 
long the defendant was incarcerated prior to the plea), and 
an explanation from the defendant as to why she pled guilty 
to a crime she did not commit.  The panel would then 
                                                          
136 See, for e.g., the Pittsburgh Citizen Review Board 
http://www.city.pittsburgh.pa.us/cprb/ 
 
137 See, for e.g., the Atlanta Citizens Review Board http://acrbgov.org/ 
 
138 See, for e.g., Las Vegas Citizen Review Board 
https://www.citizenreviewboard.com/ 
 
139 See, United States Courts information at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
FederalCourts/JuryService/about-jury-service.aspx 
 
140 See, for e.g, State of Connecticut Judicial Branch jury statistics at 
http://www.jud.ct.gov/statistics/jury/Jury_12.pdf (showing that in the 
Connecticut Superior Court in 2012, 537,041 summonses were issued, 
92,851 jurors served and 6,154 jurors were selected for trial).  
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determine whether the totality of the circumstances suggests 
“substantial doubt as to the accuracy of the guilty plea.” In 
cases involving pleas to misdemeanors, the review panel 
could be given the power to set aside a conviction and 
functionally acquit the defendant if it concluded that there 
was substantial doubt as to the accuracy of the plea. In 
felony cases (where there is likely to be more resistance to 
acquittal by a panel), a finding of substantial doubt could 
qualify the defendant for a post-conviction relief proceeding 
(and the appointment of counsel) on the grounds that it is 
likely they pled guilty to a crime they did not commit.141 The 
case would then go before a judge to determine whether 
there was enough evidence to support the guilty verdict.  
 
In many cases the evidence would show the 
defendant was guilty, for example in cases where the 
prosecution has strong evidence against a defendant or 
where the defendant has no convincing explanation as to 
why she entered a guilty plea. However, in other cases 
defendants would be able to make the requisite showing.  
Regardless, the guilty plea panel procedure we are 
proposing would provide some opportunity to have 
convictions set aside for “unexonerated” persons without 
putting significant pressure on criminal justice 
infrastructure.   
 
Thus defendants who decided to plead guilty rather 
than go to trial would still have some opportunity to have 
their guilt or innocence decided by a panel of their peers.  
While historically this citizen involvement in the criminal 
justice system was provided by jury trials,142 we no longer 
have a system of jury trials.  As the Supreme Court recently 
stated, we have a system of pleas.143  But the core function 
                                                          
141 This is currently not a ground for post-conviction relief in any 
jurisdiction we are aware of, although some states do have a general “in 
the interests of justice” category of post-conviction claim.  See, e.g., S.C. 
Code § 17-27-20(a)(4) . 
 
142 The Supreme Court has stated that juries  “guard against a spirit of 
oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers” and act as an intermediary 
between the State and criminal defendants (United States v Gaudin 515 
U.S. 506, 510-511). 
 
143
 Lafler, supra, at 1388. 
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that jurors play – providing an accused “an inestimable 
safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and 
against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge”144 – is 
equally important in the current “need to plead” system.145  
The ability to have a citizen plea review panel would extend 
the historical protection provided by juries to all defendants, 
not just the 3% who go to trial.146 This is especially critical in 
the current regime as innocent defendants who plead guilty 
                                                                                                                                  
 
144
 Duncan v Louisianna, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), at 156.  See also Richard 
Lippke, Plea Bargaining After Lafler and Frye:  Plea Bargaining in the Shadow 
of the Constitution, 51 Duq. L. Rev. 709, 714 (2013) (“Jury trials were 
viewed as serving important public values, in ensuring the integrity of 
charge adjudication procedures against the suspicions of corruption or 
tyranny, and in educating the public by bringing them into contact with 
more learned judges and involving them in debates about public 
affairs”).    
 
145 See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal 
Procedure, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 911 at 916 (2006) (noting that in the current 
system plea bargaining subverts rights to public information and 
participation in criminal trials and describing plea bargaining as a “low 
visibility procedure run by insiders”). 
 
146
 In her excellent article, The Plea Jury, 85 Indiana L. J. 731 (2010), Laura 
Appleman proposes the use of a “plea jury” that would be impaneled to  
sit alongside the judge in deciding whether to accept a guilty plea. Under 
Appleman’s proposal, the jury would assess three things: whether the 
factual basis admitted by the defendant fits the alleged crimes; whether 
the plea was knowing and voluntary; and, whether the proposed 
sentence is appropriate. We have no fundamental quarrel with this 
suggestion, but we believe our proposal to be more pragmatic and 
effective especially in cases in our first and the largest category 
(defendants charged with minor or relatively minor offences).  It is not 
feasible to impanel a jury in such cases given the current criminal justice 
infrastructure. Furthermore, the questions put to the jury in Appleman’s 
proposal do not necessarily speak to the systemic pressures that lead to 
innocent defendants pleading guilty.  For example, there is no 
consideration of the strength of the underlying evidence and no 
consideration beyond the current “knowing and voluntary” standard of 
reasons why the defendant may be pleading guilty to something they 
did not do.  Additionally, if the plea jury does not accept the plea, then 
the defendant is permitted to withdraw the plea and go to trial, a 
different plea could be agreed to, or the plea jury could recommend a 
different sentence. In many cases, this would not actually help an 
innocent defendant who wanted or needed to be released from custody 
as soon as possible.  
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are often those who are most vulnerable to over-zealous 
prosecutors.147  
 
We acknowledge that there may be difficulties with 
our proposal because some potential jurors selected to 
participate on a guilty plea review panel may take the 
“intuitive” approach that someone who pleads guilty 
probably is guilty (the “I would never plead guilty to 
something I did not do” mentality).  However, this could be 
remedied by providing the panel with some basic 
information about “unexonerated” defendants. A more 
fundamental problem may be that, without access to counsel 
or resources, the procedure may be of limited value for 
many persons who plead guilty.  On the other hand, keeping 
the process simple and not overly “legalistic” would 
encourage participation even by unrepresented defendants.  
We understand that it is not a perfect proposal, but it would 
provide some access to justice to innocent defendants who 
plead guilty and would also provide much needed citizen 
involvement in the criminal justice system.   
 
Finally, we could attempt to truly level the criminal 
justice playing field by: a) adequately funding indigent 
defense systems;148 b) increasing the quality of appointed 
defense counsel149; c) mandating true open file policies by 
                                                          
147
 Because establishing review by a guilty plea panel would provide 
some oversight of prosecutors plea bargaining behavior and would 
hopefully discourage the current widespread practice of threatening 
excessive punishments in order to pressure defendants into pleading 
guilty.  
 
148
 See John H. Blume and Sheri Lynn Johnson, Gideon Exceptionalism?, 
122 Yale L.J. 2126 (2013) (detailing the pervasive problem of incompetent 
defense counsel and inadequate funding for investigative and expert 
services for indigent defendants).  
 
149
 See Wilbur v. City of Mt. Vernon, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171187 (W.D. 
Wash. Dec. 4, 2013), in which the District Court found that public 
defense systems in Mt Vernon and Burlington, Washington deprived 
those faced with misdemeanor charges of the right to assistance of 
counsel, in what had become a “meet and plead” system.  
 
    THE UNEXONERATED                                            
 
 
 
42
prosecutors;150 d) not allowing jailhouse informants to 
testify;151 and, e) preventing the use of what has been 
recognized by the National Science Academy as “junk” 
forensic science.152  But, in the final analysis, this is probably 
the most unrealistic of all the proposals we have discussed.    
 
V. Conclusion 
 
The case of the West Memphis Three may be unique 
in the amount of publicity it attracted, but it represents only 
the tip of the iceberg of “unexonerated” defendants. As 
Justice Kennedy recently observed: “the reality [is] that the 
criminal justice system today is for the most part a system of 
pleas, not a system of trials.”153 The current criminal justice 
system (this “system of pleas”) offers no effective safeguards 
to defendants to protect them against over-zealous 
prosecution or even effective oversight of prosecutorial 
conduct. Vulnerable defendants are left at the mercy of 
prosecutors, who not only need to deal with cases quickly to 
clear their heavy workloads, but also often have professional 
incentives to obtain convictions quickly.154 In this system, the 
protections afforded by trial by jury, said to be “fundamental 
                                                          
150
 See Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics and the Road to the 
Disbarment of Mike Nifong: The Critical Importance of Full Open-File 
Discovery, 15 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 257 (2008) (highlighting the importance 
of disclosing exculpatory information and evidence). 
 
151
 Alexandra Natapoff, Beyond Unreliable, How Snitches Contribute to 
Wrongful Convictions, supra.  
 
152 See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE REPORT, STRENGTHENING 
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009) at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf; see also Paul C. 
Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need To Regulate 
Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 163 (2007) (documenting failures of crime labs 
and forensic techniques and arguing for increased regulation of forensic 
evidence). 
 
153 Lafler, supra, at 1388. 
 
154
 Daniel Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance To Post-
Conviction Claims of Innocence, supra, at 134 (reviewing professional 
incentives for prosecutors to obtain and maintain convictions). 
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to the American scheme of justice”155 are lost, legal 
regulation is almost non-existent and, as William Stuntz 
stated: “law’s shadow disappears” leaving a system where a 
defendant’s fate is dependent on “prosecutorial preferences, 
budget constraints and political trends.”156 In this system, 
innocent people are pleading guilty, and join the 
“unexonerated,”often with severe consequences. 
 
We have made several suggestions to reduce the 
number of the “unexonerated” and to infuse additional 
judicial oversight and citizen participation in to the criminal 
justice system. Our most original suggestion is to use citizen 
review panels made up of jury members to review guilty 
pleas and ensure that there is not “substantial doubt” as to 
the accuracy of a plea. If developed and implemented, this 
could provide some opportunity to have convictions set 
aside for “unexonerated” persons and, without putting 
significant pressure on criminal justice infrastructure, 
preserve the fundamental principle that: “the truth of every 
accusation…should be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage 
of…equals and neighbours, indifferently chosen and 
superior to all suspicion”.157 We recognize the practical 
difficulty in any proposed reform of the current plea 
bargaining process and the substantial debate that has 
already taken place as to reform of the system, but, at a 
minimum, we hope to stimulate debate and discussion of the 
plight of the “unexonerated.”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
155
 Duncan v Louisianna, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). 
 
156
 William Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Laws Disappearing 
Shadow, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2548, 2548 (2004) 
 
157
 Duncan v Louisianna, 391 U.S. at 151-152. 
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